REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 23-04-2008	2. REPORT TYPE FINAL	3. DATES COVERED (From - To)

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Context, Culture, and Connection: Avoiding the Counter-productive Effects of Mirror Imaging In Theater Security Cooperation	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) Patrick J. Cummings, LCDR, USN Paper Advisor (if Any): CDR Kubista	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

14. ABSTRACT Mirror imaging allies and adversaries is largely an innocent mistake, but not without repercussions. It is also easily countered by simply considering context, culture and connection. This is especially relevant in our low-intensity Phase 0 operations, i.e. our Theater Security Cooperation, as conducted by our military's Combatant Commanders. In our effective American nature to adapt and overcome, we often do apply these considerations. However we only apply them at the tactical levels of interaction. We apply them in reaction to a lack of these considerations at the operational and strategic levels. A proactive application of them is necessary. Specifically, the counter-productive effects of mirror imaging in our Theater Security Cooperation is easily prevented by considerations of context, culture and connection at the operational level of leadership and decision making.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Mirror Imaging, Context, Culture, Connection, Theater Security Cooperation Planning (TSCP), CORDS, CAP, HTS, Ethnography, Engagement, Shared Interests

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: UNCLAS			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED		17	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

Context, Culture, and Connection: Avoiding the Counter-Productive Effects of Mirror Imaging In Theater Security Cooperation

by

Patrick J. Cummings

Lieutenant Commander, USN

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

23 April 2008

Table of Contents

Abstract

Mirror imaging allies and adversaries is largely an innocent mistake, but not without repercussions. It is also easily countered by simply considering context, culture and connection. This is especially relevant in our low-intensity Phase 0 operations, i.e. our Theater Security Cooperation, as conducted by our military's Combatant Commanders. In our effective American nature to adapt and overcome, we often do apply these considerations. However we only apply them at the tactical levels of interaction.   We apply them in reaction to a lack of these considerations at the operational and strategic levels. A proactive application of them is necessary.

Specifically, the counter-productive effects of mirror imaging in our Theater Security Cooperation is easily prevented by considerations of context, culture and connection at the operational level of leadership and decision making.

Introduction

Karen Hughes stared at the audience of 500 Saudi women, taken back by the unpredicted annoyance and anger that many of them were expressing. As the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, it had been her aim to connect with them on the theme of freedom at this meeting in Jedda, Saudia Arabia. She came to help develop better relations with citizens of an ally, a relationship that has suffered some setbacks in the recent past, by connecting on universal interests of women. This was a logical course of action, based on her convictions, experiences, and beliefs. Yet, Ms Hughes's mention of driving and voting, presented as the examples of the ability to "fully participate" in society, drew resentment, defensiveness, and indignation.[1] This is an example of mirror imaging; Ms Hughes filled gaps in her knowledge of her audience and their opinions by assuming they were the same as her own. By mirror imaging her convictions, experiences and beliefs onto her audience, Ms Hughes caused a greater rift, at least on some levels, than had existed prior to her speech. This is one example, though by no means an isolated example, of a well-intentioned representative from the U.S. government making a counter-productive effort in foreign engagement, all because we so often unconsciously make logical, but false and invalid[2], assumptions in developing our courses of action. It is largely an innocent mistake, but not one without repercussions.

Yet, mirror imaging is also easily countered by simply considering context, culture and connection. This is especially relevant in our low-intensity Phase 0 operations, i.e. our Theater Security Cooperation, as conducted by our military's Combatant Commanders. In our effective American nature to adapt and overcome, we often do apply these considerations. However we only apply them at the tactical levels of interaction. We apply

them in reaction to a lack of these considerations at the operational and strategic levels. A proactive application of them is necessary.

Specifically, the counter-productive effects of mirror imaging in our Theater Security Cooperation is easily prevented by considerations of context, culture and connection at the operational level of leadership and decision making.

TSCP Process

So why does this apply to Theater Security Cooperation? Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) is the means by which the Dept. of Defense encourages and enables countries and organizations to work with us to achieve strategic objectives. It helps build allies' capacity to defeat threats, e.g. terrorism; and to help prevent threats from emerging. The themes inherent in the Combatant Commander's (CoCom) Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) must support the Dept. of Defense's National Defense Strategies to (a) Assure allies and partners, (b) Dissuade potential adversaries, (c) Deter aggression and counter coercion, or (d) Defeat adversaries.[3] As such, a TSCP is the Combatant Commander's Phase 0 effort to influence the relevant actors in his Area Of Responsibility (AOR) in favor of U.S. interests. It could also more broadly be described as an interactive marketing campaign, where the product being pitched is the joining of interests and subsequent actions beneficial to the U.S. It is the military's means of making friends and influencing people by reaching out and interacting with them, commonly through exercises and similar engagements.

In contrast to the regimented, tightly scripted, and bureaucratic Joint Operation Planning and Force Planning[4], the combatant commander's Security Cooperation Planning gives him a much freer hand in executing his responsibilities; it is the laissez–faire version of the U.S. State Department's foreign policy doctrine. The intent of the Secretary of Defense's

codified guidance found in the Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG)[5] is to combine the previously "stove-piped" planning guidance found in some 30 various documents, which was often inconsistent, unclear, and conflicting.[6] It also provides a foundational, symbiotic, and synthesized guidance in order to more effectively spend our time, space, and force investments.[7] These aspects of the SCG give the CoCom the agility, speed, and authority to tailor U.S. engagement actions to suit the dynamic and nuanced nature of successful, operational level engagement.

Mirror-Imaging

However, the strength of this construct can also present a weakness. The process of deciding on which tools to employ in support of our TSC themes, objectives, and priorities involves the CoCom's Plans Division, or J-5. Given a certain country within the combatant commander's region; its current political, social, and economic situation; and the subsequent SecDef priority for Security Cooperation engagement, the J-5 develops various courses of action with which to engage this country in order to meet a strategic objective. These courses of action are based on sound logic built on the staff's combined professional base of experience and knowledge. Yet, given the international context of Security Cooperation and the inherent social, political, and economic difference between the two interacting countries, in virtually all cases, there is an inevitable clash of cultures.

This is obvious and not a revelation. Were there is no risk of friction, there would be no need to devote much effort to planning. However, "the mere existence of cultural differences is rarely the cause of conflict."[8] Nor is it factual that the courses of action are developed without consideration to context, culture or connection. The problem is that in engagements between the U.S. and other countries, sometimes only one context and culture

may be considered, i.e. the context and culture of the officers in the combatant commanders' J-5 staffs.

It is not a stretch to describe the background, experience and formative influences of the professional military officers of the J-5, and subsequently their culture, to be fairly uniform. By and large, the mid-level and senior military officers are male Caucasians. They generally hold conservative political views. They have matured in highly structured, disciplined, and codified work environment. They have all grown up speaking English, watching American television, and interacting almost exclusively with fellow citizens of their own country in a middle-class family. This is not a negative or critical assessment, as it also accurately describes the author; but it is a factual assessment all the same.

The ramification of this is that the logical conclusions of these staff officers inevitably lend to courses of action that are not necessarily valid. In other words, given the factual assessments of a given country, the prescribed and logical investments for the TSCP will prove ineffectual and even counter-productive. This is because the natural assumptions the decisions are based on do not reflect the reality of the other actors involved in the engagement. This might be cynically cast as a failure in the logical assessment, arrogance in the form of willful disregard, or even the convenient excuse of an intelligence failure. In reality, however, it is simply the contrast of two perspectives, as formed by the lenses of the two different contexts and cultures. This gap is bridged when these contexts and cultures are understood within established connections.[9]

Context: CORDS and CAP versus the "Concept" in Vietnam

The U.S. Army's Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development System (CORDS) and the U.S. Marine Corps's Combined Action Platoons (CAP) during the

Vietnam Conflict provide two historical examples of effectively considered context in a backdrop of a severe lack of contextual considerations. By context, I mean the facts and circumstances that form the setting for an event. In this case, the U.S. military made operational and strategic decisions for this Asian insurgency conflict framed in the conceptual context of a sequel to WWII in Europe. While culture and connection were also relevant, we'll focus on context because of the gross disparity of its consideration in this comparison between CORDS and CAP versus the "Concept".

The Army's CORDS program was actually a maneuver by the U.S. State Department to co-opt "significant Army means in theater to conduct its pacification and counterinsurgency strategy."[10] Headed by Amb. Robert Komer, deputy to General Westmoreland, CORDS used soldiers to train Vietnamese villagers in basic security operations, employing them as paramilitaries in their own hamlets and districts. This program was conceived, initiated, and executed due to effective insight and understanding into the relevant contextual implications of the war. The South Vietnamese population was the relevant center of gravity; The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) was not the relevant center of gravity, and the persistent quest for decisive, conventionally fought battles with them did not change this. Since the U.S. State Department "could not get the Army to modify its approach to the war, they could at least divert some Army resources to pacification and pull some Army officers along in their wake."[11] The U.S. senior military leadership did appreciate the CORDS program, though this was more for the fact that they freed up Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) and U.S. troops for the attrition-focused operations. Discounting CORDS was a huge mistake for General Westmoreland and Secretary McNamara, because the CORDS's Regional Forces (RF's) and Popular Forces

5

(PF's) were contextually the best application of force, and also the best source for context. They had the greatest impact on population security in country and even contributed more efficiently, though indirectly, to the attrition campaign, as attributed to by their superior cost to kill ratio.[12]

The U.S. Marine Corps' CAP approach, similar to CORDS in its objective and size, was less of a departure from its participants' service's experiences. The Marines had already published the Small Wars Manual[13] covering such operations, based on their myriad deployments to S.E. Asia, South America and the Caribbean earlier in the century. A company commander named Capt. Jim Cooper expounded upon the concepts, on his own initiative. Constantly frustrated with the transitory nature of his security gains while conducting the prescribed search and destroy missions, he deployed his unit "inside the hamlet and announced that henceforth the people would be protected from the VC, for he had come to stay."[14] He combined his effort with the PF paramilitaries, all of which proved extremely effective. In time, this program spread with continued success. A squad of six to eight men would become deeply, personally involved with the Vietnamese people in their areas, living among them, training Vietnamese volunteers in tactics.[15] The hamlets protected by CAP were nearly twice as secure as those under I Corps, in less time, with roughly half the casualty rate.[16] In fact, the training conducted between the Marines and the PF's went both ways. As CPL Barry Goodson relates in CAP Mot:

> "The PF's taught us, especially me, far more about jungle warfare and survival in the bush than the Marines ever hoped to accomplish. The Vietnamese were adept at living in the harshest conditions. They could spot booby traps on the darkest of nights. They could teach us how to actually smell the presence of the enemy. After living among the Vietnamese people and fighting beside them in numerous battles I began to realize that other units in Vietnam were, speaking metaphorically, 'fighting in the dark'…"[17]

Unfortunately, the CORDS and CAP Programs did not fit into SecDef McNamara's "Concept"[18], and thus were summarily neglected as a focus of effort. The Concept basically consisted of an evolved maneuver warfare that sought large-scale, decisive battle with North Vietnamese regular forces, while disregarding the need to hold and maintain any appreciable area for longer than the course of a battle or patrol. The Concept was superbly tailored to U.S. military strengths, along with the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy air operations. It was a logical choice of military options if one considered the U.S. arsenal and capabilities. However, the Concept did not consider the fact that the enemy was not the Soviet Union or a Western European, industrialized country. Fundamentally speaking, the Concept was an exceptionally evolved Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that nonetheless was grossly misapplied in the context of Vietnam due to the fundamental error of mirror imaging at the operational and strategic levels of military leadership. Operational art became war by algebra, which rarely, if ever, is successful.

The result of this mirror imaging and the application of the Concept were operations based on the negative aim of resisting the communist aggression of an invading, foreign army and an embedded insurgency via conventional tactics designed for Western Europe, vice an effective counterinsurgency and pacification campaign tailored to the specific context. An obvious flaw of this Concept was the fact that the NVA had a miniscule logistics requirement and could retreat back into North Vietnam unopposed. Thus, the large-scale losses inflicted on the NVA would have been decisive, had the North Vietnamese Government been a democratic, Western state, or even perhaps had the threat of an invasion of the North been credible. Yet, the huge losses incurred by the NVA had no repercussions on the North Vietnamese government, because the U.S. openly refused to invade the north,

for fear of escalation with China and the U.S.S.R.[19] The massive fire power directed at the

North's industrial base and supply routes would surely have crippled an industrialized

country fielding a resource-hungry military and general populace, if indeed the U.S. had been

facing an industrialized country with a resource-hungry military and general populace. Thus,

the massive air operation, Rolling Thunder, and its attempt to cut off the invading NVA and

Viet Cong (VC) supply chain was poorly conceived due to the fact that "the Communists

needed only 34 tons a day from sources outside the South. Seven 2 1/2 -ton trucks could

transport the requirement, which was less than 1 percent of the daily tonnage imported into

North Vietnam."[20] The Concept's aim of meeting the enemy in a large-scale, decisive battle

via maneuver, mass, and firepower would have worked brilliantly, had only the NVA and

VC been kind enough to cooperate more often. Unfortunately, the NVA fought only

sporadically and at times beneficial to them.[21] The Viet Cong (VC) insurgency was virtually

invisible to the regular ground forces fighting them. Any gains made by the "Concept's"

search-and-destroy strategy was quickly negated when VC forces followed the departing

U.S. forces' footsteps and re-instituted their influence and control.

By disregarding context, i.e. operational art, the U.S. mirror imaged its adversary in

Vietnam at the strategic and operational levels, resulting in the employment of an impressive

RMA that was grossly misapplied with disastrous results. In comparison, CORDS and CAP

were products derived from proper context, which produced superior decision making.

The decisions were superior because they were based on the actual facts and circumstances

relevant to the decisions, i.e. context. This is relevant when considering TSCP, as the basic

framework is the same, even if the means for conducting it are not so kinetic and lethal. In

most TSC cases, the U.S. engages with a nation with a much smaller military, economy, and

industrial base. Mirror imaging the context of our own country and its military, economy, and infrastructure easily leads to seriously flawed and counter-productive expenditure of time, effort, and money.

Culture: HTS versus Eclipse II in OIF

A second example of poorly constructed strategy and operational plans due to mirror imaging and its false assumptions was the Army's Phase IV operations plan for Iraq in early 2003, code named Eclipse II. In this case, mirror imaging erased any relevant cultural considerations that would have prompted a more rigorous approach to the Phase IV plans. While context and connections were also factors, let's focus on the cultural considerations of this case.

Named after the occupation plans for post-WW II Europe and perhaps more tailored for that culture than for Iraq's, Eclipse II was very general in terms of post-conflict stabilization and security. This lack of detailed planning, in contrast to the comprehensive Phase III operational plans, was based on three, invalid assumptions. The first assumption was that there would be a large number of Iraqi security forces willing and able to support the occupation. Secondly, it was assumed that the international community would pick up the slack from the U.S. military, i.e. significant support from other nations, IGO's, and NGO's, despite widespread opposition to the U.S.-led invasion. And third, it was assumed that an Iraqi government would quickly form, allowing a quick hand-off to an interim Iraqi administration with a UN mandate.[22] In anticipating responses to the invasion in terms of Western culture, such as a strong sense of civic duty, transparent democracy, and the unbiased rule of law, military planners assumed the status of welcomed liberators and subsequently failed to consider that an insurgency might arise. It was assumed that all would

be wrapped up and turned over to the newly formed Iraqi democracy by June of 2004; Phase IV plans would not be needed.[23] This was a clear case of mirror imaging our plans at the Operational level through the culture of a previous effort at Phase IV sixty years earlier, in a different continent (Europe), following a different conflict (WWII), with an adversary who shared a very similar.

In hindsight, this was a terrible mistake, one that we are still working to overcome. Yet, a consideration of the Iraqi culture would have easily countered the three foundational, yet incorrect, assumptions.[24] Over twenty years under a harsh dictatorship erased any memory of responsible self-governance in Iraq; a "quick hand-off" will be measured in years, not months. The huge shift in political influence among the different religious segments of Iraq will preclude a large, concerted IGO and NGO effort until stability and security are the norm. Five years later, arguably, it is just now starting to happen. The big assumption that there will be a large number of Iraqi security forces at hand to assist in securing normalcy was sadly and ironically thwarted by our own hand when Amb. Bremer disbanded the Iraqi military and conducted wholesale de-Baathification throughout every segment of the Iraqi government.[25] A review of insurgencies, past and present, reveals that civil society and the implications of its culture "constitute the real center of gravity."[26] When formulating our Phase IV plans for OIF, mirror imaging the U.S. and European culture onto the situation in Iraq, with its recent, tumultuous leadership and more ancient traditions and cultures was doomed to produce the troubles we are facing today. The remedy for this, along with context and connection, would have been the perspective of culture.

One positive development to this situation is the tactical effort to infuse some cultural understanding as seen in the Army's Human Terrain System (HTS) and Marine Corps's

Operational Cultural Learning.[27] This includes pre-deployment training, adding culture

training into Professional Military Training, language programs and the eventual

establishment of institutional continuity in considering culture at the brigade level.   It is a

dynamic effort, consisting of a continual and iterative assessment of cultural environment,

ensuring effective granularity and relevance.[28] Other facets of HTS include graphically

mapping the cultural elements of an area along with contact data for community leaders, e.g.

sheiks, government officials, Iraqi Security Forces. This Human Terrain Mapping serves as a

type of Modified Combined Obstacles Overlay (MCOO) that depicts the relevant actors and

provides an enduring corporate knowledge for the rotation of units into Iraq.[29]

HTS is an improvement on the CORDS and CAP concepts in that it elevates the

scope of the contextual and cultural understanding from purely tactical into the lower

operational levels of OP Art. LTC Jack Marr wrote in a 2008 article in the periodical

Infantry, "Building a trusted network involves personal relationships between Coalition

leaders at the tactical level and the leaders of the populations they secure…It's all about the

people."[30] This is a trustworthy statement built on the success HTS has had at the tactical

level. However, it should not be limited to its tactical application. Cultural considerations

are necessary at the Operational level of leadership or we'll consistently be trying to cover

for flawed operational design with tactical remedies. Superior tactics cannot account for

flawed strategy and misdirected campaigns.[31] The concept of cultural and contextual

considerations needs to elevate beyond the brigade level up to the CoCom staff. With the

larger implication for culture's impact inherent in low-intensity conflicts, application of

cultural considerations needs to extend beyond Phase IV operations and into the Phase 0

considerations of TSCP.

In an Operational level form, the counter-part to HTS would more closely resemble a cultural anthropologist's ethnography. While not quite a dossier or a crystal ball, predicting behavior and responses, the cultural insight necessary for a CoCom and his staff to construct an effective TSCP is more like a lens with which to view the situation from the perspective of our partner's culture. An effective product would enable him to solve the TSCP problems while employing the calculus from both cultures.

This useful employment of culture in the TSCP process also requires a Cognitivist construct, as opposed to the "Hobbsian, zero-sum, universal will to dominate"[32] construct of the Realist or the "utopian, universal will to cooperate" construct of the Idealists, both of which fall victim to mirror imaging by assigning a universal behavior.[33] The Cognitive construct avoids the two vulnerable extremes of the Hobbsian and Utopian descriptions of human nature by contending that decisions are based on perception and belief. [34] Any one actor's environment, background, experiences, ethics, values, beliefs and perceptions will affect, and ultimately govern, his decisions. Failure to account for this inevitably leads to bad assumptions derived from unconscious mirror imaging; culture counts.

Connection: Relationship versus "Universal Civilization" in TSCP today

Samuel Huntington, in The Clash of Civilizations, observes a current example of erroneous mirror-imaging occurring in the United States, and in Western Europe as well. Specifically "the idea…that the spread of Western consumption patterns and popular culture around the world is creating a universal civilization."[35] This is observed in the West, at large, not necessarily in the military. Yet, as previously expressed, the military is not completely separate from the larger culture that it serves. The hopeful, but false, expectation of a "universal civilization" is that by exporting our culture, whether by cars, Coca-Cola,

music, fashion, entertainment, or CNN, we somehow convince the world to accept our values, ideals, and culture.[36] This idea of a "universal civilization" then logically equates to positive engagement, increased cooperation, and common interests. In short, a common appetite for Big Macs will yield common interests. Yet if this were true, was the West "Japanized" in the 1980's when we consumed millions of Japanese cars, TV's, cameras, etc? The answer is clearly "no," and to a point it is the converse, as antagonistic sentiments toward Japan were just as prevalent at that time.[37] To get someone to accept the precepts of the rule of law requires more than exporting the TV show "Law and Order."

More importantly, it is not necessary to share the same culture, i.e. a "universal civilization," in order to share interests, which is the goal of engagement and TSC. Japan and the U.S. have many shared interests despite a very different culture. Subsequently, we share a very robust level of engagement and cooperation. However, developing shared interests is predicated upon developing a relationship, or to put it another way, connections are the *sine qua non* for TSC success. The background and method behind the U.S./Japanese connection is fairly unique and certainly not the prescribed process for relationship building in the TSC process, but it does have ingredients inherent to every successful connection. More than mere financial investments (which help), they must also be investments of time and effort.

This is especially true when the two parties have different cultures and a limited history of interaction and cooperation, which typically describes the environment of TSC. Sadly, our track record in this has historically been quite poor. Any interaction between the U.S. and countries in our various TSCP at best yield contacts, not connections. What I mean by this is that U.S. military personnel engage in short, ad hoc, and functionally focused

exercises and training, only to shake hands and move on to the next assignment. The service members would never likely be in a position to renew and build on this relationship in any subsequent engagements, even if they had continued to keep in contact with their counterparts after the engagement. The result is that with all our investment of time, toil and treasure in TSCP with other nations, any influential connections made, any insight into their government's context and environment, any understanding gained into the calculus of their culture is lost. Context and culture are only accurately derived from a connection. At best, any relevant TSCP gains are archived in one of many different lessons learned databases, which, through the fault of many, rarely yield their intended benefit. Thus, when future CoCom staffs wrangle with the way ahead for engaging a country, they will often be starting from scratch. They have little in the way of accurately constructing the problem, other than mirror-imaging their own context and culture in their assumptions of their counterparts. What a challenge this presents to the TSC process in the 52 countries on the continent of Africa, though I believe this has shifted with the establishment of AFRICOM.[38]

Counter-Point: Cultural Considerations in Algeria (1954 – 1962)

A fair counter to the historical examples showing a failure in policy due to lack of context, culture and connection would be that both in Vietnam and Iraq there were instances where these issues of context and culture were taken into account and yet the policy failed all the same. In other words, how can we say context, culture and connection do anything to affect mirror imaging and operational success if CORDS, CAP, and HTS didn't ultimately figure decisively in their application? In fact, there is an example of a more conscious and dedicated effort to avoid mirror imaging that also failed spectacularly, i.e. France's Algerian War (1954 – 1962).

Governor-general Soustelle, the early governor of the French colony, realized that to bring the Algerians under peaceful governance, he had to deal directly with the sources of the unrest. To that end, he created the Sections Administrative Specialise'es, or S.A.S., which sought to empower the Muslim and Berber Algerians with educational, agrarian and industrial investment.[39] He also established the Kepis Bleus (Blue Caps), a S.A.S. corps of French Army junior officers "who [were experts] in Arabic and Arab affairs and could deal with every conceivable aspect of administration."[40] The Kepis Bleus were to stabilize the remote areas of Algeria, which were under constant threat from unorganized rebels and organized resistance armies alike.[41] Yet neither Soustelle, nor any other French governor could stem the insurgency, despite these contextual, cultural, and connection investments.

However, these investments also share a critical feature found in the CORDS and CAP in Vietnam, as well as in the HTS of OIF. To be sure, context, culture and connection are no panacea. All of these considerations were applied in unsuccessful campaigns, though it is critical to note that they were applied only at the tactical level, vice operational or strategic. Soustelle did have designs on a broader focus, but was consistently stymied by the Frenchmen who had transplanted to Algeria, known as the *pied noirs,* and the French military.[42] The government administrators were all clumped into their comfortable *pied noir* enclaves on the coast, leaving the interior of country an under-governed space successfully exploited by the insurgency. Both the pied noirs and the military inflamed the insurgency with escalated reprisals, which were as randomly targeted as the terrorism that prompted them. So despite a conscious effort to lead the colony with assertive considerations of context, culture, and connections, Soustelle's could not direct the French effort effectively enough to apply them in practice, beyond the tactical level. This, combined with the *pied*

noirs' and military's mirror imaging of their antagonists, resulted in the classic mistakes of a counter insurgency instead of a successful model of one. This was the same issue in Vietnam, as well as the initial plans for OIF. Superior tactics cannot make up for a flawed operational design. Context, culture and connection don't solve every problem in and of themselves. But, they do repeatedly prove themselves necessary in countering the negative effects of mirror imaging, particularly in low-intensity conflict and when soft power is your course of action for influence, a la TSC.

Conclusions: Context, Culture, and Connection

As Combatant Commanders and their staff develop their TSCP, context, culture and connection are necessary considerations in the development of their courses of action and selection of the SecDef's Key Tools. The tendency to mirror image is a constant pull, which means that all three of the considerations are concurrently relevant, despite our more narrow focus in the case studies.

Context is best obtained by careful application of Operational Art. This doesn't mean a more scripted and codified method of generating TSCP is necessary. It is, by nature, the agile and tailored tool of the Combatant Commander to engage in his AOR. But it is incumbent on his staff to purposefully avoid mirror imaging with the proper context.

Culture, as a tool for TSC, is growing in its realized application, though it is hardly new. Sun Tzu advised as much with his axiom "Know enemy and know your yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."[43] Nonetheless, we have a long history of mirror imaging for lack of cultural considerations. Whether by expanding the access and scope of HTS and other similar programs, or by the formal incorporation of cultural anthropologists' ethnographies, the lenses of culture need to be applied in the TSC process. One way to apply

this would be to "war game" the TSCP, using someone with cultural and contextual insight of the country in question as the "red cell." Ideally, this would be a cultural anthropologist, but could simply be someone with extensive experience working with the other country. The U.S. State Department comes to mind for this, as would defense attaches or FAO's[44].

Connections must be persistently sustained with our relevant partners in the TSC engagement, as connections are the foundation for shared interests as well as an essential ingredient to obtaining valid contextual and cultural understandings. The typical once-a-year engagement by a completely new set of personnel needs to adjust to meet the need for building recurring connections. State Department expertise already fills this role in some ways. The inclusion of them in our CoCom staffs could greatly improve the TSC process, as could the expansion of the FAO program. At the operational level, this should also include the sustained engagement from dedicated CoCom staff with specific countries and specific connections, in order to fully realize the effects of this benefit.

In closing, the counter-productive effects of mirror imaging in our Theater Security Cooperation is easily prevented by considerations of context, culture and connection at the operational level of leadership and decision making.

Notes

[1] Steven R. Weisman, "Saudi women dispute U.S. envoy's notions," *New York Times*, September 28, 2005, national edition, http://www.nytimes.com/ (accessed 19 April 2008)
Guy Dinmore , "Saudi students rebuff US communications guru," *Financial Times*, September 27 2005, http://www.ft.com/ (accessed 19 April 2008)
Editorial, "'Selling' America: Karen Hughes's Mideast trip gets unfair reviews," *Wall Street Journal*, October 11, 2005, http://www.opinionjournal.com (accessed 19 April 2008)
[2] "Logical" meaning the correct conclusion based on the given premises or assumptions. "Valid" includes the definition for Logical, but also requires that the premises and assumptions actually be true, which "Logic" does not.

[3] U.S. Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, quoted in D.D. Sullivan, "Security Cooperation Plan: JMO II-13 Seminar Exercise," Powerpoint, 26 November 2000, Newport, RI: Naval War College, JMO Department.

[4] U.S. Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, quoted in D.D. Sullivan, "Security Cooperation Plan: JMO II-13 Seminar Exercise," Powerpoint, 26 November 2000, Newport, RI: Naval War College, JMO Department.

[5] U.S. Department of Defense, *The Security Cooperation Guidance(U),(Secret)* quoted in D.D. Sullivan, "Security Cooperation Plan: JMO II-13 Seminar Exercise," Powerpoint, 26 November 2000, Newport, RI: Naval War College, JMO Department.

[6] U.S. Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, quoted in D.D. Sullivan, "Security Cooperation Plan: JMO II-13 Seminar Exercise," Powerpoint, 26 November 2000, Newport, RI: Naval War College, JMO Department

[7] Naval War College, *Joint Operational Planning Process Workbook (NWC 4111H)*

[8] Kevin Avruch, *Culture and Conflict Resolution*. pg 30.

[9] Ibid, pg 30.

[10] Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., *The Army and Vietnam*, (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 217

[11] Ibid, 217

[12] Ibid. 219-221. Cost to Kill ratio refers to the fact that the RF/PF's contributed to roughly 12-30% of VC deaths, despite only consuming 2-4% of the total operating cost of the war.

[13] U.S. Marine Corps, *United States Marine Corps Small Wars Manual,* (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1940)

[14] Ibid, 172

[15] Barry Goodson, *Cap Mot*, pg viii

[16] Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam,* 174.

[17] Barry Goodson, *Cap Mot*, pg ix

[18] Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam,* pgs 121-124, 174-175,

[19] Harry Summers, *On Strategy: Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, pg 127

[20] Michael Clodfelter, *The Limits of Air Power,* pg 134.

[21] Ibid. pg 134.

[22] Thomas Ricks, *Fiasco*, pg 109 – 110.

[23] Ibid, 109-111

[24] Jacob Kipp et al., *The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century,* Military Review, September-October 2006, pg 8

[25] Ricks, *Fiasco,* pg 73

[26] Kipp, *The Human Terrain System,* pg 9

[27] Ibid, pg 8

Barak Salmoni, *Advances in Predeployment Culture Training: The U.S. Marine Corps Approach*, Military Review, November-December 2006, pg 82

The U.S. Army uses the term HTS, which includes the term Human Terrain Mapping (HTM), while the U.S. Marine Corps uses the term Operational Culture Learning. For

simplicity sake, I used the term HTS to broadly apply across all of the different services' programs for cultural considerations.

[28] Salmoni, *Advances in Predeployment Culture Training,* pg 82

[29] Jack Marr et al., *Human Terrain Mapping: A Critical First Step in Winning the COIN Fight*, Infantry, Jan/Feb 2008, pg 14

Salmoni, *Advances in Predeployment Culture Training,* pg 82

Again, the Army and Marine Corps have different terms for essentially the same process. I chose the Army term, Human Terrain Mapping (HTM)

[30] Ibid, pg 15.

[31] After penning this sentence, I figured that the basis for it was from reading Milan Vego's *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice.* I could not find anything that resembled the statement, so I'll take credit myself, but I'll bet Vego says something about this.

[32] Avruch, *Culture and Conflict Resolution,* pg 29

[33] Ibid*,* pg 29, 70

[34] Ibid, pg 58.

[35] Huntington, Samuel, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. pg 58.

[36] Ibid. pg 58.

[37] Ibid, pg 58.

[38] William Ward, "Testimony," House, *AFRICOM Posture Statement Before The House Armed Services Committee On 13 March 2008,* 110th Cong. 2nd sess., 2008. http://www.africom.mil/ (accessed 19 April 2008).

General Ward laid out the requirement for persistent, sustained engagement with the nations of Africa in order to develop the connections necessary for productive TSC.

[39] Alstair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, pg 108

[40] Ibid, pg 109

[41] Ibid, pg 109

[42] Ibid, pg 107, 112.

[43] Sun Tzu, *Art of War,* ed. and trans. Samuel B. Griffith, pg 84

[44] FAO: Foreign Affairs Officer

Bibliography

Avruch, Kevin *Culture and Conflict Resolution.* Washington D.C.: United States Instituted of Peace Press, 1998.

Barak Salmoni, *Advances in Pre-deployment Culture Training: The U.S. Marine Corps Approach*, Military Review, November-December 2006, pg 79-88.

Clodfelter, Michael *The Limits of Air Power.* New York, NY: The Free Press, 1989.

Dinmore, Guy. "Saudi students rebuff US communications guru," *Financial Times*, September 27 2005, http://www.ft.com/ (accessed 19 April 2008).

Goodson, Barry *Cap Mot: The Story of a Marine Special Forces Unit in Vietnam, 1968-1969.* Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 1997.

Horne, Alstair *A Savage War of Peace*. New York, NY: New York Review Books, 1977.

Huntington, Samuel *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

Kipp, Jacob, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow, and Don Smith. *The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century,* Military Review, September-October 2006, pg 8-15.

Krepinevich, Andrew F. Jr. *The Army and Vietnam.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.

Marr, Jack, John Cushing, Brandon Garner, and Richard Thompson. *Human Terrain Mapping: A Critical First Step in Winning the COIN Fight*, Infantry, Jan/Feb 2008, pg 11-15.

Naval War College, *Joint Operational Planning Process Workbook (NWC 4111H),* Newport, RI: Naval War College.

Ricks, Thomas *Fiasco*. New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2006.

Summers, Harry *On Strategy: Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*. New York, NY: Dell, 1982.

Sun Tzu, *Art of War,* Edited and translated by Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1963.

U.S. Congress, House, *AFRICOM Posture Statement: Hearing before The House Armed Services Committee On 13 March 2008,* 110th Cong. 2nd sess., 2008. http://www.africom.mil/ (accessed 19 April 2008).

U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol 1, Planning Policies and Procedures (CJCSM 3122.01A).* Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005.

U.S. Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.* Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005. Quoted in D.D. Sullivan, "Security Cooperation Plan: JMO II-13 Seminar Exercise," Powerpoint, 26 November 2000, Newport, RI: Naval War College.

U.S. Department of Defense, *The Security Cooperation Guidance(U),(Secret)* quoted in D.D. Sullivan, "Security Cooperation Plan: JMO II-13 Seminar Exercise," Powerpoint, 26 November 2000, Newport, RI: Naval War College, JMO Department.

Wall Street Journal, "'Selling' America: Karen Hughes's Mideast trip gets unfair reviews," October 11, 2005, http://www.opinionjournal.com (accessed 19 April 2008).

Weisman, Steven R. "Saudi women dispute U.S. envoy's notions," *New York Times*, September 28, 2005, national edition, http://www.nytimes.com/ (accessed 19 April 2008).